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Michael Friedman and Alfred Nordmann, editors. The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century
Science. Cambridge, MA-London: MIT Press, 2006. Pp. ii + 370. Cloth, $45.00.
The book originates from an international conference held in November 2000 at the
Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology at MIT. The main conviction
of the authors is that not only the development of modern mathematics, foundations
of mathematics, and mathematical logic, but also the development of modern scientiﬁc
thought can be better understood as an evolution from Kant. The main reason for focusing on the nineteenth century is that this will allow us to set aside the question of whether
the Kantian analysis has lost its relevance in the context of the twentieth-century scientiﬁc
revolutions. The thirteen articles in the book explore “the complex and subtle tracing of
the multiple intellectual transformations that have led, step by step, from Kant’s original
scientiﬁc situation to the new scientiﬁc problems of the twentieth century” (1).
The articles can be grouped in ﬁve main focal points of the nineteenth-century scenario. The
ﬁrst three articles explore the Kantian legacy in the origin, development, and growth of Naturphilosophie, and its connection with the nineteenth-century scientiﬁc work. In more detail, Frederick
Beiser argues that, contrary to a widespread opinion, the transition from Kant to Naturphilosophie
arises as a resolution of the Kantian problems. Robert J. Richards discusses the inﬂuences of
Schelling on Goethe’s Kantian dilemmas, and how this affected Goethe’s scientiﬁc work in biology.
The third paper is Michael Friedman’s analysis of how Naturphilosophie was crucial in Oersted’s
experimental work in electromagnetism.
The subsequent two articles focus on a more detailed analysis of the philosophy of science
of Frie, recognized as an important ﬁgure in the science and mathematics of the time. The idea is
that Frie connects the two worlds of Naturphilosophie and neo-Kantianism, so that analyzing his
philosophy will provide a better understanding of the transition between the two. In more detail,
Frederick Gregory argues that Frie can be seen as extending Kant’s connection between philosophy
and science, analyzing in particular Frie’s views on chemistry. The same line of though is developed
by Helmut Pulte, who discusses in addition Frie’s views on biology and pure mathematics.
In the third and fourth groups the focus is on neo-Kantianism. First, there is an analysis of
scientiﬁc thinkers like Helmholtz. Robert DiSalle describes Helmholtz’s neo-Kantian empiricism
in connection (and in contrast) with Poincaré’s conventionalism, while Timothy Lenoir analyses
Helmholtz’s theory of perception in connection with Kant, discussing the inﬂuence of the development of new media technologies on his work.
Then the analysis moves to the Marburg school of philosophy, in particular the philosophy of Cohen, Cassirer, Riehl, and Pierce. Alan Richardson argues that the relations between
epistemology and philosophy of science were already discussed by these philosophers.
Michael Heidelberger’s main idea is that the philosophy of Riehl has been as inﬂuential
as that of Mach for logical empiricists like Schlick, while Alfred Nordmann discusses the
similarities and differences between Riehl, Cohen, and Pierce in connection with Kant.
The last three articles deal with Poincaré’s philosophy, mathematics, physics, and the
relations among them. Even if Poincaré, contra Helmholtz, never identiﬁed himself as a
neo-Kantian, like Helmholtz he defended broadly Kantian views. In particular, Janet Folina
analyzes and defends Poincaré’s arguments for the (Kantian) view that mathematical reasoning is synthetic a priori. Jeremy Gray defends the view that, even given his conventionalism, Poincaré adopted a more intuitive conception than the one of Hilbert. Lastly, Jesper
Lüzen compares and contrasts the Kantian, empiricist, and conventionalist tendencies of
Hertz and Poincaré.
Like all collection of articles, the book suffers from an inevitable discontinuity of
style and sometimes of focus, as well as some repetitiveness. Despite that, it is remarkably
comprehensive, complete, clear, deep, and incisive. The literature on Kant is notoriously
immense, but I have not seen so far a similarly interesting book on this particular topic,
on whose importance I agree with the authors. In fact, as is well known, Kant’s philosophy
has been tremendously inﬂuential in almost all areas, either because it was rejected or
because it was reformulated and extended to accommodate new developments in science,
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mathematics, and philosophy in a purely Kantian spirit. While the existence of this inﬂuence seems clear, it is not at all straightforward exactly what it consists in, and how it was
relevant for the subsequent development of science, mathematics, and philosophy. This
book’s aim is exactly to elucidate these issues, and it succeeds very well.
Va l i a A l l o r i
Northern Illinois University

David Leopold. The Young Karl Marx: German Philosophy, Modern Politics, and Human Flourishing. Ideas in Context, 81. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Pp. xii + 315. Cloth, $105.00
David Leopold positions this work as “for a new generation of readers who no longer feel
obliged to swallow (or spew out) Marx whole.” He does not mention the more powerful
and widespread pressure—to ignore or distort Marx. This is an antidotally meticulous, if
somewhat Talmudic, study of the young Marx. Its ﬁrst chapter is a historical introduction
to the corpus of Marx’s early work and its complex history of posthumous publication. Its
second and third chapters situate his ideas within the German philosophy of the period,
spelling out its differences from Hegel and Bruno Bauer (with perhaps disproportionate
preoccupation with the anti-Semitism of Bauer). The fourth chapter entitled “Human ﬂourishing” is very much the most interesting. No concept is so widely incanted by contemporary
philosophers and so lacking in principled ground, while no work is more suggestive here
than the early Marx’s. The ﬁfth and ﬁnal chapter is Leopold’s “Epilogue,” which usefully
reviews the book’s general argument.
The young Marx has long inspired interest because his critique of capitalism and political
economy is so dynamically emancipatory in its naturalist humanism. Leopold is not moved.
To give a paradigmatic taste of his treatment, he excoriates a very famous passage of the
young Marx—“Communism . . . is the genuine resolution of the conﬂict between man and
nature, and between man and man . . . the riddle of history solved”—as “opaque,” “isolated
and contested,” “patently implausible,” and with “no textual support elsewhere” (244–45).
As contemporary philosophers in general, he does not relate to Marx’s deepest unifying
ideas. Connective horizons and transformative social vision are beyond the ken—to use
Marx’s own phrase for the fate of an early work—of “the gnawing criticism of mice.” The
given syntax of philosophical acceptability blocks them.
Consider another turning-point of dismissal in this study. Here Marx’s identiﬁcation of
the deﬁning principle of human work as “raising a project in the head before erecting it in
reality,” the architect’s construction versus the bee’s, is repudiated as saying nothing about a
“human essence.” The reason for this, argues Leopold, is that such projective consciousness
could be possessed by an extra-terrestrial species too (225–26). The essential connections
here are overridden by appeal to a non-fact. Yet the differentia speciﬁca of human being that
Leopold dismisses is the deﬁning human ontology of “foresight” that distinguishes men
from slaves in Marx’s favorite ancient philosopher, Aristotle, and of Marx’s own regulating
principle of human freedom that explains why he regards the working class in capitalism
as dehumanized into “wage slavery.” Marx’s vision of a communist society cannot therefore
be understood as what it is at the existential level—a human project in macro form, a social
plan of the associated producers that enables their self-governing freedom in place of their
external subjugation by the life-blind capitalist mechanism.
Regrettably, Leopold consistently condescends to or fails to recognize the integrating
onto-ethical logos of Marx’s philosophy. Early on, he dismisses without argument Marx’s
epistemology as unqualiﬁed for “philosophical interest” (47–48), although Bertrand Russell regarded it (e.g., the young Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach) as the ﬁrst ever “activist epistemology.” Russell elsewhere tartly commented that “originality is the one thing unoriginal
minds cannot see use of.” Analytic condescension here as elsewhere is apt to hollow out
philosophical substance in the name of it.

